Market Concentration, Growth, and Acquisitions

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Discussion by Maarten De Ridder

- Productivity growth has declined since mid-2000s, after a boom in 1990s
- Firm concentration has been rising since the 1980s
- Startups have become much more likely to be acquired
- Sparked interest: how are these linked? Role for antitrust intervention?
- Endogenous growth model with oligopolistic competition and acquisitions
- Quantification: increase in firms' span of control making large firms larger

Large firm acts as a collection of small firms that avoids cannibalization

- · Firms expand by making directed innovation investments
- Small firms: invest to improve the productivity of all goods in the economy
- Large firms: avoid improving the productivity of own products
 - Idea: other firms can (almost) copy leading productivity
 - No value in improving own product, \rightarrow facilitates competitor productivity
- Surplus from acquisition: they reduce large firms' creative destruction rate

Trivial implication: policy maker should ban acquisitions? No!

Trade-off:

- Acquisitions enable large firms to occupy large % of product space
- Alternative way to do this is to creatively destroy competitor small firms
- Acquisitions add value to starting firm, creative destruction reduces it
- \Rightarrow Optimal policy depends on how elastic small firm innovation is to CD/Aq.

Great, creative paper with a plausible new mechanism and interesting trade-offs

Two comments:

- 1. Should we think of own-product improvements as cannibalization?
- 2. What happens with creative destruction as firms grow large?

Assume firms don't benefit from innovating on products they already control

- Innovation proportionally raises competitor productivity: constant markup
- In practice, own-variety improvement can offer many benefits to the firm
 - Can raise productivity gap leader and follower: higher markup (Peters '20)
 - Improvements can raise demand for varieties (Akcigit & Kerr '18)
- In practice, own-variety improvement is important contributor to growth
 - Garcia-Marcia, Hsieh and Klenow ('19): responsible for most GDP growth

Hence: is the mechanism in the paper a "worst case" scenario?

• Quantitatively robust to an extension where internal innovation is useful

Benefit of large firm: face less creative destruction. Is this true in the data?

- Assume that firms lose products through a Poisson process
- Poisson flow rate is $\tau(n_{it})$, n_{it} is number of products (firm size)
- Assume a simple functional form for the creative destruction rate:

$$\tau(n_{it}) = \tau \times n_{it}^{\sigma}$$

• Usual assumption: $\sigma = 1$ (e.g. Klette and Kortum 2004). Weiss $pprox \sigma < 1$

$$\mathbb{E}[n_{it}^{c}|n_{it-1}] = \exp(\sigma \log n_{it-1} + \eta_{it})$$
(1)

Estimate σ using French administrative micro data

- Berlingieri, De Ridder, Lashkari and Rigo '23
- Data on 10-digit product codes from production survey for manufacturing
- Define creatively destroyed as products produces at t 1, not at t
- Estimate a Pseudo-Poisson Maximum Likelihood regression along

$$\mathbb{E}[n_{it}^d|n_{it-1}] = \exp(\sigma \log n_{it-1} + \eta_{it})$$

• Robust finding: $\sigma \geq 1$, preferred estimate $\sigma = 1.15$

- What is the link between concentration, acquisitions and growth?
- New model: large firms acquire small firms to reduce creative destruction
- Policy faces tradeoff between acquisitions and excessive creative destruction
- Comment: perhaps large firms are more benign then they seem